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Purpose: The aim of this study is, first to describe and explore equity agency costs; second, to explore the 
impact of capital structure on equity agency costs; and finally, to examine the impact of agency costs on the 
performance of listed companies. 
Methodology: Panel data regression has been used for research data analysis. 
Results: The results of the work show that equity to capital and long-term debt to capital variables have 
a positive and significant impact on the agency costs of listed companies in the Republic of Croatia. The 
study indicates that long-term debt to capital variable has a negative and significant impact on the agency 
costs of listed companies in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, we find evidence to suggest that 
changes in agency costs have little or no effect on the performance of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic. The findings suggest that the capital structure decisions affect the agency costs of 
listed companies and the agency costs may affect corporate performance. 
Conclusion: This study makes a number of contributions to the agency costs literature. It presents the first 
study of agency costs of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic that uses panel data, 
a technique that enables us to isolate both cross section and time series effects. The present paper can help 
managers to better understand equity agency costs and their effects on corporate performance. 
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1. Introduction
The idea of agency relationships emphasizes that 
managers, stockholders, bondholders and other 
parties act in their own self-interest and that costly 
conflicts may arise due to these self-interests. Share-
holders face an agency problem in that their agents, 
the managers, may not act diligently on their behalf 
and may enjoy substantial salaries or excessive per-
quisites. The agency costs refer to costs that arise 
as a result of these conflicts between owners and 
managers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out 
that using debt helps to overcome the agency costs 
of equity. The need to make regular debt-service 
payments can discipline managers. Moreover, debt 
limits the management’s ability to destroy value 
through perquisite consumption or lack of effort. 
Increased leverage also incurs costs and as lever-
age increases, the agency costs of debt rise (Jensen, 
1986). The firm’s value-maximizing capital struc-
ture will balance the agency costs of debt and equity 
with the other costs and benefits of debt. 
Several seminal papers have provided the empirical 
framework for the main linkages between capital 
structure and agency costs. While there is a gen-
eral consensus on the importance of capital struc-
ture for corporate agency costs, there is no agree-
ment on the impact of corporate capital structure 
on such costs. Thus, there is a need for further re-
search to provide a better understanding of equity 
agency costs and the impact that capital structure 
has on them. This paper addresses this gap to pro-
vide further evidence in the case of listed compa-
nies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
The present research focuses on examining the in-
terplay of capital structure, equity agency costs and 
corporate performance in the three Member States 
of the European Union. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate 
by empirically investigating the impact of capital 
structure on equity agency costs, as well as the im-
pact of agency costs on the profitability and value 
of listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic. The purpose of this study is to give 
general recommendations for financial managers 
on how capital structure decisions should be made 
in order to reduce equity agency costs and improve 
corporate performance.
This study makes several contributions to the agen-
cy costs debate. First, it adds to the general debate 
about equity agency costs in the listed companies 
by showing how agency costs can affect corporate 
performance. More specifically, this is the first di-
rect study of agency costs in Croatian listed com-
panies. Furthermore, this is the first study of agency 
costs of listed companies in the three above-men-
tioned countries that uses panel data, a technique 
which enables us to isolate both cross-section and 
time-series effects. This is also the first study, to 
our knowledge, to investigate the impact of capital 
structure on agency costs, as well as the impact of 
agency costs on corporate performance in these 
three countries. Finally, the study also contrib-
utes to a better understanding of the relationship 
between agency costs and corporate performance 
in the Member States of the European Union that 
have undergone transition processes.
2. Literature Review
An agency problem arises when there is a conflict 
of interest between the agents and the principals. It 
may also arise due to asymmetric information. Ac-
cording to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both par-
ties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there 
is good reason to believe that the agent will not al-
ways act in the best interests of the principal. In most 
agency relationships, the principal and the agent will 
incur positive monitoring and bonding costs. In ad-
dition, there will be some divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and the decisions, which would 
maximize the welfare of the principal. Shareholders 
face an agency problem in that their agents may not 
act diligently on their behalf. Managers may con-
sume excessive wages or excessive perquisites; an-
other issue might be if they are too conservative or 
too aggressive in their investment strategy. Agency 
costs can be defined as the sum of: the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, the bonding expendi-
tures by the agents and the residual loss. 
The creditors of a corporation entrust their money 
to the managers, on the belief that the risks asso-
ciated with debt securities will not increase sub-
stantially but managers could increase the wealth 
of the shareholders at the expense of the creditors 
by moving to a more risky asset structure. As the 
debt-to-total assets ratio increases, the agency costs 
of debt increase, and creditors will demand an in-
terest rate that provides equilibrium return after 
agency costs (Seitz & Ellison, 1995, p. 547). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) find that managers of levered 
companies have an incentive to engage in asset sub-
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stitution and underinvestment. Asset substitution 
problem lies in promising to invest in a safe asset to 
obtain a return reflecting low risk but then substi-
tuting it with a riskier asset that offers the possibil-
ity of a higher return. The underinvestment prob-
lem occurs when the shareholders rationally forgo 
the project because they must invest the additional 
capital while all the benefits accrue to the creditors. 
Jensen (1986, 1993) suggests that debt servicing ob-
ligations help to discourage overinvestment of free 
cash flow. Myers (1977) suggests that short-term 
debt helps mitigate the agency costs of debt by re-
solving the underinvestment and asset substitution 
problems. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that using 
debt helps overcome the agency costs of outside eq-
uity. Managers have an incentive to generate the fi-
nancial resources needed to service the debt. When 
assessing how much debt to use, corporations have 
to consider the agency costs of increased debt. The 
agency costs associated with debt consist of: the op-
portunity wealth loss caused by the impact of debt 
on the investment decisions, the monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by the bondholders and the 
owner-manager, and the bankruptcy and reorgani-
zation costs.
Capital structure can balance out the conflict be-
tween shareholders and management, as well as 
that between shareholders and creditors. The 
agency costs of outside equity derive mainly from 
informational asymmetries and excessive perqui-
site consumption, while the agency costs of debt, 
though deriving from the same phenomena, are 
mainly related to risk incentives, investment incen-
tives and bankruptcy costs (Moschandreas, 2000). 
Ang et al. (2000) as well as Singh and Davidson 
(2003) argue that the sales-to-asset ratio measures 
the efficiency with which management uses the 
firm’s assets to generate sales. A high asset turnover 
ratio shows a large amount of sales and ultimately 
cash flow that are generated for a given level of as-
sets. A low ratio would indicate that management is 
using assets in non-cash flow generating and prob-
ably value destroying ventures. While a higher asset 
turnover may be identified with efficient asset man-
agement practices and hence shareholders value 
creation, a lower sales-to-asset ratio reflects asset 
deployment for unproductive purposes. Therefore, 
firms with a considerable amount of agency con-
flict will have lower asset turnover ratios relative to 
those having less agency conflict. 
A higher level of debt may be used as a disciplin-
ary method to reduce managerial cash flow waste 
through the threat of liquidation (Grossman & 
Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash 
flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). Thus, debt will 
have a positive effect on the value of a corpora-
tion. According to Williams (1987), additional debt 
decreases agency costs. Opler and Titman (1993) 
argued that corporations that have high growth 
prospects are more likely to be better managed and 
less likely to have excess free cash flows because the 
available cash will be spent on positive net present 
value projects. 
Most theoretical and empirical studies of agency 
costs have examined the impact of capital structure 
on such costs. Thus, several papers have provided 
the empirical framework for the main linkages be-
tween capital structure and agency costs. Singh and 
Davidson (2003) find that outside block ownership 
may have a limited effect on reducing agency costs. 
The results of Li and Cui (2003) indicate that firms 
with a higher debt-to-asset ratio have a higher ra-
tio of sales to assets and a higher ratio of return on 
equity, and this relation is statistically significant. 
Harvey et al. (2004) provide new evidence that debt 
creates shareholder value for companies that face 
potentially high managerial agency costs. 
There is a significant body of literature that shows 
that debt decreases rather than increases agency 
costs. Childs and Mauer (2008) find that financial 
flexibility stimulates taking on short-term debt 
resulting in a reduction in the agency costs. Flor-
ackis and Ozkan (2008) investigated the potential 
interactions between internal governance mecha-
nisms and firm growth opportunities in determin-
ing agency costs. The results reveal that managerial 
ownership, managerial compensation and owner-
ship concentration seem to play an important role 
in mitigating agency costs. Zhang and Li (2008) ex-
amined the impact of financial leverage on agency 
costs by conducting the multivariate and univari-
ate tests based on data of UK listed companies; the 
findings suggest that leverage is negatively related 
to agency costs. McKnight and Weir (2009) find 
that changes in board structural characteristics 
have little or no effect on agency costs. Indeed, they 
find that firms with more debt tend to have lower 
agency costs and that debt reduces agency costs. 
Wellalage and Locke (2012) investigated agency 
costs in 100 firms in New Zealand. The results 
indicate that the degree of owner involvement in 
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the business influences firm agency costs. Nozari 
(2016) examined the impact of financial leverage 
on agency costs in listed manufacturing firms of 
Tehran Stock Exchange; the findings suggest that 
debt-to-equity and long-term debt ratios have a 
negative and significant impact on agency costs. 
Rashid (2016) points out that managerial owner-
ship reduces the firm’s agency costs only under the 
asset utilization ratio measure of agency costs. 
Several researchers have examined the impact of 
agency costs on firm performance, but with diver-
gent findings. Chi (2005) investigated the relation 
between firm value and the shareholder rights; the 
findings suggest that granting more rights to share-
holders could be an effective way to reduce agency 
costs and enhance firm value. Nam and Wynne 
(2006) investigated the impact of agency costs on 
the value of single-segment and multi-segment 
firms; the findings suggest that firms with high 
equity-based compensation have higher valuation 
than firms with low equity-based compensation. 
Jiraporn and Tong (2007) investigated changes in 
firm value with respect to changes in debt maturity 
structure and found consistent evidence that short-
term debt enhances firm value. Xiao (2009) finds 
that agency costs have a negative and significant im-
pact on firm value. Wang (2010) investigated how 
agency costs influence firm performance; the find-
ings suggest that agency costs have a negative and 
significant impact on firm performance. Jabbary et 
al. (2013) examined the impact of agency costs on 
the performance of listed firms. The results reveal 
a significant relationship between agency costs and 
firm performance. 
Dawar (2014) investigated empirically the impact 
of capital structure choice on firm performance 
in India based on the agency theory. The findings 
suggest that leverage has a negative influence on fi-
nancial performance of Indian firms. Colombo et 
al. (2014) used the lens of the resource-based view 
and horizontal agency cost theory to examine the 
effect of ownership structure on the performance 
of Italian high-tech entrepreneurial firms. The re-
sults indicate that the number of owner-managers 
has a positive effect on firm performance, whereas 
the effect of the number of non-manager individual 
shareholders is negligible. While owner-managers 
engender low horizontal agency costs, non-manag-
er individual shareholders generate high horizontal 
agency problems because of their limited manage-
rial involvement. Moscu (2014) examined the rela-
tionship between capital structure and profitability 
of Romanian listed companies. The results indicate 
that firm’s performance measured by ROA, ROE, 
RCA and MBR is significantly influenced by capital 
structure.
Savitri (2018) examined the relationship between 
family ownership agency costs, financial perfor-
mance and companies’ business strategies. The 
findings suggest that agency costs influence busi-
ness strategy and financial performance, which 
shows that agency costs contribute to both the 
increase and decrease of financial performance. 
Pandey and Sahu (2019) examined the relation-
ship among debt financing, agency costs and the 
performance of Indian firms. The findings suggest 
a significant and negative effect of debt on firm per-
formance. The magnitude of debt is also found to be 
positively affecting agency costs.
Imelda and Dewi (2019) investigated the impact 
of capital structure and corporate governance on 
agency costs. Capital structure is measured by 
debt-to-asset ratio and long-term debt-to-asset ra-
tio. The results reveal that debt-to-asset ratio has a 
significant impact on agency costs, while the long-
term debt-to-asset ratio, managerial ownership, 
and board size do not have a significant impact 
on such costs. Anh and Thao (2019) examined the 
impact of capital structure on firm performance of 
Vietnamese listed companies based on agency cost 
theory. The findings suggest that there is an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between leverage and return 
on equity (ROE).
Khan et al. (2020) investigate the effect of corpo-
rate governance quality and ownership structure 
on the relationship between the agency costs and 
firm performance. The results indicate that the 
agency-performance relationship is positively af-
fected by corporate governance quality, owner-
ship concentration, and non-state ownership. State 
ownership has a negative effect on the agency-
performance relationship. The analysis adds to the 
empirical literature on agency theory by provid-
ing useful insights into how corporate governance 
and ownership concentration can help modify the 
agency-performance relationship. Hundal (2020) 
examines the association between the Economic 
Value Added (EVA) and the firm decision-making 
and performance, and the interplay between the 
EVA and agency costs. The findings suggest that the 
EVA provides a broader basis of measurement of ef-
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ficiency and motivates managers to make efficient 
utilization of funds.
Previous empirical studies have presented a variety 
of viewpoints regarding capital structure decisions 
and agency costs, the difference between their em-
pirical results being attributable to the differences 
in databases, time periods and the respective 
specificities of each country. However, these stud-
ies failed to explore agency costs thoroughly. Fur-
thermore, there is a gap in the empirical literature 
regarding the issue of agency costs in the context 
of Croatian, Slovenian and Czech listed companies. 
Our research contributes to the empirical literature 
by bridging this gap.
3. Research
3.1 Methodology and data
In this research, we used data from three members 
of the European Union: the Republic of Croatia, 
the Republic of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
Croatia and Slovenia have been chosen for a com-
parative analysis because they were once part of the 
same country and consequently followed similar 
economic and political patterns for a long time. The 
Czech Republic, on the other hand, has been cho-
sen for this comparative analysis because all three 
countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Croatia, were formed as a result of the split of their 
former countries that used to belong to the same 
socio-economic system, and have undergone tran-
sition processes. 
This paper presents results from the empirical re-
search undertaken on a representative sample of 
Croatian, Slovenian and Czech listed companies 
with the aim of exploring the impact of capital 
structure on agency costs and the impact of agency 
costs on corporate performance. Our initial sample 
was constructed from 228 listed companies. From 
the sample, companies that belong to the financial 
and governmental sectors were excluded because of 
additional requirements that apply to these sectors. 
Companies showing extreme or inconsistent fig-
ures in any of the variables were also excluded from 
the sample. The final sample consisted of a balanced 
panel of 143 companies listed in the period from 
2009 to July 1, 2013, when Croatia joined the Euro-
pean Union. Therefore, we cannot take into consid-
eration a longer period of time or attempt to imple-
ment the analysis with more current data. However, 
we believe that our empirical contribution will al-
low future contributions to compare the impact 
of capital structure on agency costs, as well as the 
impact of agency costs on corporate performance 
across different scenarios after the year 2013.
Statistical data analysis was carried out using Stata 
program version 15.0. Panel data regression was 
used for research data analysis, and constant coef-
ficients (pooled) regression models, fixed-effects 
models and random-effects models were consid-
ered. If there is significant cross sectional or signifi-
cant temporal effect, we cannot assume a constant 
intercept α for all the companies and years; rather 
we have to consider the one-way or two-way error 
components model. We have a fixed effect model 
if the errors are assumed to be fixed. Fixed effects 
explore the relationship between predictor and out-
come variables within an entity. The fixed effects 
model is considered under two assumptions: het-
erogeneous intercepts and homogeneous slope, and 
heterogeneous intercepts and slopes. Fixed effects 
remove the effect of the time-invariant characteris-
tics so we can assess the net effect of the predictors 
on the outcome variable. The fixed effects model 
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where α is the unknown intercept for each entity, Yit 
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coefficient for that variable, uit between entity error 
and within entity error (Vijayamohanan, 2016).
In this section, an overview of the variables that 
were used in our empirical analysis is provided:
(1)  Equity to Capital = Equity/Total Capital Em-
ployed 
(2)  Retained Earnings to Capital = Retained 
earnings/Total Capital Employed
(3)  Long-term Debt to Capital = Long-term 
debt/Total Capital Employed
(4)  Agency costs are measured as 
•  Asset Utilization Ratio = Annual Sales/To-
tal Assets
(5)  Profitability is measured as
• Return on Assets (ROA)
(6)  Firm value is measured as 
•  Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio = 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes * (1- 
Profit Tax) / (Capital and Retained Earn-
ings * Interest Rate on Deposits) (Belak, 
2014, pp. 201-203).
The sales-to-asset ratio is used as a proxy for equity 
agency costs. This ratio is a measure of how effec-
tively the firm’s management deploys its assets and 
agency costs are inversely related to the sales-to-
asset ratio. The sales-to-asset ratio has been used 
in two US studies as a direct measure of agency 
costs, Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson 
(2003). Both studies argue that the sales-to-asset 
ratio measures the efficiency with which manage-
ment uses the firm’s assets to generate sales. A high 
ratio shows that assets are generating significant 
sales and therefore suggests low agency costs. In 
contrast, a low ratio shows that management is 
implementing policies such as poor investment de-
cisions or consuming excessive perquisites. A low 
sales-to-asset ratio indicates high agency costs and 
inefficient asset utilization. McKnight and Weir 
(2009) argue, as do Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and 
Davidson (2003), that the sales-to-asset ratio pro-
vides a useful indicator of agency costs. 
3.2 Results of empirical analysis 
Based on a sample of listed companies in Croatia, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic, we investigated 
the impact of capital structure on agency costs, as 
well as the impact of agency costs on corporate per-
formance. 
3.2.1 The impact of capital structure on agency costs
Our central research question is the effect of dif-
ferent components of capital structure on equity 
agency costs. The proxies for capital structure are 
the following: equity to total capital, retained earn-
ings to total capital and long-term debt to total cap-
ital ratios. The ratio of annual sales to total assets is 
used as an inverse proxy for equity agency costs. In 
interpreting these results, it is important to remem-
ber that the sales-to-asset ratio varies inversely with 
equity agency costs. The impact of capital structure 
on the agency costs of listed companies in Croatia 
has been analyzed, as shown in Table 1.










Equity to capital -.4219 .0501 -8.41 0.000 -.5202 -.3236
Retained earnings to capital   -.0001 .0001 -0.49 0.624 -.0002 .0001
Long-term debt to capital           -.3945 .0631 -6.25 0.000 -.5182 -.2707
Constant .6922 .0314 22.04 0.000 .6305 .7537
Dependent variable: Sales-to-Asset Ratio 
R2 = 0.166 
F test: F(88, 353) = 49.93; Prob > F = 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan test: chibar2 (01) = 694.03; Prob>chibar2 =0.000 
Hausman test: chi2(3) = 18.56; Prob> chi2 = 0.0003 
White test: chi 2 (9) = 21.00; Prob>chi2 = 0.0127 
Wooldridge test: F(1, 88) = 22.67; Prob>F = 0.000 
Source: Author’s calculations
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This study investigated the impact of capital struc-
ture on equity agency costs of listed companies in 
Croatia. Using the Hausman test and the F test, 
the fixed effects model has been selected as the ef-
ficient and consistent model for the variable sales-
to-asset ratio. Agency costs are inversely related to 
the sales-to-asset ratio. The regression coefficients 
reported for equity to capital and long-term debt 
to capital variables in the fixed effects model are 
negative, which may be an indication that these 
capital structure components have a negative and 
significant impact on the sales-to-asset ratio, as well 
as a positive and significant impact on the agency 
costs of listed companies in Croatia, because equity 
agency costs are inversely related to the sales-to-
asset ratio. 
The impact of capital structure changes on equity 
agency costs of listed companies in Slovenia has 
been investigated and the results of panel regres-
sion analysis are presented in Table 2. 










Equity to capital -.7846 .1564 -5.01 0.000 -1.0913 -.4779
Retained earnings to capital -.2104 .0678 -3.10 0.002 -.3434 -.0774
Long-term debt to capital      .1505 .0342 4.39 0.000 .0833 .2176
Constant .8529 .0461 18.49 0.000 .7625 .9434
Dependent variable: Sales-to-Asset Ratio 
R2 = 0.1738, F test: F(28,113) = 28,56; Prob > F = 0.0000, Breusch Pagan test: chibar2 (01) = 196.08; Prob>chibar2 =0.0000 
Hausman test: chi2(3) = 2.01; Prob> chi2 = 0.5705, White test: chi 2 (9) = 17.94; Prob>chi2 = 0.0359 
Wooldridge test: F(1, 28) = 1.414; Prob>F = 0.2444 
Source: Author’s calculations
Using the Hausman test and Breusch-Pagan La-
grange Multiplier test, the random effects model 
has been selected as the efficient and consistent 
model for the dependent variable sales-to-asset ra-
tio. The regression coefficients reported for equity 
to capital and retained earnings to capital variables 
in the random effects model are negative and statis-
tically significant at the 1% level, which may be an 
indication that these capital structure components 
have a negative and significant impact on the sales-
to-asset ratio, as well as a positive and significant 
impact on the equity agency costs of listed compa-
nies in Slovenia. The regression coefficient reported 
for long-term debt to capital variable in the random 
effects model is positive and statistically significant, 
which indicates that long-term debt to capital vari-
able has a positive and significant impact on the 
sales-to-asset ratio, as well as a negative and sig-
nificant impact on the equity agency costs of listed 
companies in Slovenia, because equity agency costs 
are inversely related to the sales-to-asset ratio. As 
regards Slovenia, the findings suggest that increas-
ing long-term debt financing to some extent can 
decrease equity agency costs of listed companies. 
The impact of capital structure on equity agency 
costs of Czech listed companies has been examined 
and the results of panel regression analysis are pre-
sented in Table 3. 










Equity to capital -.0019 .1414 -0.01 0.989 -.2792 .2753
Retained earnings to capital        .2973 .1549 1.92 0.055 -.0062 .6009
Long-term debt to capital           .2947 .1421 2.07 0.038 .0161 .5733
Constant .2339 .0907 2.58 0.010 .0561 .4118
Dependent variable: Sales-to-Asset Ratio 
R2 = 0.1743, F test: F(23, 69) = 20.78; Prob > F = 0.0000, Breusch Pagan test: chibar2 (01) = 87.03; Prob>chibar2 =0.0000 
Hausman test: chi2(1) = 7.39; Prob> chi2 = 0.0065, White test: chi 2 (9) = 17.43; Prob>chi2 = 0.0424 
Wooldridge test: F(1, 23) = 7.310; Prob>F = 0.0127 
Source: Author’s calculations
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Table 4 Comparison of the regression results of the impact of agency costs on firm performance
Independent variable Coefficients Standard Error p-value
The Republic of Croatia
R2= 0.0025
Random Effects Model





















The Republic of Slovenia
R2= 0.0072
Random Effects Model














































Using the Hausman test and the F-test, the fixed ef-
fects model has been selected as the efficient and 
consistent model for the variable sales-to-asset ra-
tio. Agency costs are inversely related to the sales-
to-asset ratio. The regression coefficients reported 
for retained earnings to capital and long-term debt 
to capital variables in the fixed effects model are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
which may be an indication that these capital struc-
ture components have a positive and significant im-
pact on the sales-to-asset ratio, as well as a negative 
impact on the equity agency costs of Czech listed 
companies. Likewise, we have found evidence that 
as the long-term debt to capital variable increases, 
the equity agency costs of Czech listed companies 
tend to decrease.
3.2.2 The impact of agency costs on corporate perfor-
mance 
In this work, we also investigated the impact of eq-
uity agency costs on the profitability and value of 
listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic. Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio 
and Return on Assets are used as proxies for firm 
value and profitability. The proxy for equity agency 
costs is the sales-to-asset ratio. The obtained results 
for examined listed companies are compared as giv-
en in Table 4. 
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The regression coefficients reported for sales-to-
asset ratio are positive for Croatian and Slovenian 
listed companies, which may be an indication that 
the sales-to-asset ratio has a positive but not sig-
nificant impact on the profitability of listed compa-
nies, while agency costs have a negative impact on 
the profitability of listed companies in Croatia and 
Slovenia. This study has empirically examined the 
impact of agency costs on the profitability of listed 
companies in the Czech Republic. The regression 
coefficient reported for sales-to-asset ratio in the 
random effects model is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the 
sales-to-asset ratio has a positive and significant 
impact on the Return on Assets, while agency costs 
have a negative and significant impact on the profit-
ability of listed companies in the Czech Republic. 
Our analysis does not indicate the existence of an in-
teraction effect between agency costs and the value of 
listed companies in Croatia. As regards Slovenia, the 
study has examined the impact of equity agency costs 
on the value of listed companies measured by Sustain-
able Owners Value Added Ratio. Using the Hausman 
test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, the 
random effects model has been selected as the effi-
cient and consistent model for the variable Sustain-
able Owners Value Added Ratio. The regression coef-
ficient reported for sales-to-asset ratio in the random 
effects model is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level, which may be an indication that the 
sales-to-asset ratio has a positive and significant im-
pact on the Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio, 
while agency costs have a negative and significant im-
pact on the value of Slovenian listed companies when 
measured by Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio. 
On the other hand, the findings for the Czech Repub-
lic indicate that the impact of equity agency costs on 
the value of listed companies measured by Sustainable 
Owners Value Added Ratio is not statistically signifi-
cant. The regression coefficient reported for sales-to-
asset ratio in the Ordinary Least Squares Model is 
positive but not significant, which indicates that the 
sales-to-asset ratio has a positive but not significant 
impact on the Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio, 
while agency costs have a negative impact on the value 
of Czech listed companies.
4. Discussion
This paper addresses the issue of how capital struc-
ture components affect equity agency costs and how 
corporate performance can be influenced by agency 
costs. In contrast to previous empirical studies that 
focus only on total debt, short-term debt and long-
term debt ratios as measures of capital structure, 
the present study takes into account different com-
ponents of capital structure that may affect equity 
agency costs. This study complements the agency 
theory literature by investigating the impact of out-
side equity, inside equity and long-term debt on eq-
uity agency costs, as well as the impact of agency 
costs on corporate performance. Consequently, our 
findings expand upon previous research. To mea-
sure equity agency costs of the listed companies, 
we have used the asset utilization ratio. Our mea-
sure of equity agency costs is a proxy for the loss in 
revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization, 
which can result from poor investment decisions, 
e.g. investing in negative net-present-value assets, 
or from management’s shirking, e.g. exerting too 
little effort to generate revenue.
The results reveal that equity to capital and long-
term debt to capital variables in the fixed effects 
model are negative, which may be an indication that 
these capital structure components have a negative 
and significant impact on the sales-to-asset ratio, as 
well as a positive and significant impact on the agen-
cy costs of listed companies in Croatia. As regards 
Slovenia, the findings suggest that equity to capi-
tal and retained earnings to capital variables have 
a negative and significant impact on the sales-to-
asset ratio, as well as a positive impact on the equity 
agency costs of listed companies. This indicates that 
as values of equity to capital and retained earnings 
to capital variables increase, the equity agency costs 
of listed companies tend to increase. It is evident 
from the results that long-term debt to capital vari-
able has a negative impact on equity agency costs 
indicating that as long-term debt to capital variable 
increases the equity agency costs of listed compa-
nies in Slovenia tend to decrease. This phenomenon 
may be explained by the fact that using long-term 
debt helps overcome the agency costs of outside eq-
uity. The important benefit of using long-term debt 
is that it reduces managerial perquisite consump-
tion as the need to make regular debt-service pay-
ments effectively disciplines managers. If managers 
do not operate the corporation well enough to cov-
er the debt-service payments, creditors can force 
the corporation into bankruptcy and take control 
of it. Our results are consistent with the theory that 
debt can reduce the agency costs of free cash flow 
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by reducing the cash flow available for spending at 
the discretion of managers (Jensen, 1986) and that 
additional debt decreases agency costs (Williams, 
1987). This study finds that retained earnings to 
capital and long-term debt to capital variables have 
a positive impact on the sales-to-asset ratio, as well 
as a negative impact on equity agency costs indi-
cating that as values of retained earnings to capital 
and long-term debt to capital variables increase, 
the agency costs of listed companies in the Czech 
Republic tend to decrease. Our results further in-
dicate that using debt and retained earnings helps 
overcome the agency costs of equity. Therefore, it 
should be noted that inconsistent results on the ef-
fect of capital structure on equity agency costs are 
obtained for listed companies in Croatia, Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic. 
To summarize, we have found some evidence that 
long-term debt reduces the agency costs of eq-
uity. These costs arise because the managers make 
poor investment decisions, exert insufficient effort, 
which results in lower revenues, and consume ex-
ecutive perquisites. The magnitude of agency costs 
is determined by how well the owners and credi-
tors monitor the actions of the outside managers. 
Our paper suggests that long-term debt reduces the 
agency costs of equity, since debt-servicing require-
ments can limit management’s ability to pursue 
positive net present value projects. 
This study suggests that the effect of agency costs 
on corporate performance differs in the European 
Union. Using a number of performance measures, 
we find that changes in agency costs have little or 
no effect on the performance of listed companies 
in Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The 
results imply that the agency costs of equity have a 
negative but not significant impact on the Return 
on Assets Ratio of listed companies in Croatia and 
Slovenia. The agency costs have a negative and sig-
nificant impact on the Return on Assets Ratio of 
listed companies in the Czech Republic indicating 
that as the value of agency costs increases, the value 
of Return on Assets Ratio of listed companies tends 
to decrease.
Regarding the impact of agency costs on the value 
of listed companies in Slovenia, the findings re-
veal that equity agency costs have a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the variable Sus-
tainable Owners Value Added Ratio indicating that 
as the value of agency costs increases, the value of 
Sustainable Owners Value Added Ratio tends to 
decrease. These results appear consistent with the 
results of Xiao’s (2009) study, which found that 
agency costs have a negative and significant impact 
on firm value. This study also finds that the sales-to-
asset ratio has a positive but not significant impact 
on the value of listed companies, while agency costs 
have a negative but not significant impact on corpo-
rate value in the Czech Republic. 
Regarding the impact of long-term debt on the eq-
uity agency costs of the Slovenian and Czech listed 
companies examined in our study, we have found it 
to be negative, meaning that a higher level of long-
term debt leads to a lower level of agency costs. As 
the amount of long-term debt increases, the ex-
pected agency costs of equity decrease, while the 
value of the Slovenian and Czech listed companies 
increases, which makes long-term debt a reasonable 
option to finance their growth. Membership in the 
European Union may have an impact on the capital 
structure, agency costs and financial performance 
of listed companies: older Member States have 
greater financial stability, fewer funding constraints 
and lower risks. Although the selected countries are 
now members of the European Union, inconsistent 
results on the effect of capital structure on agency 
costs and the effect of agency costs on corporate 
value are obtained for them in the study. Croatia’s 
economic performance fell short of its potential 
during the war that raged there in early 1990s, but 
the country also become a member of the European 
Union later than Slovenia or the Czech Republic; 
hence the difference in the respective impact of 
capital structure on agency costs.
5. Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of equity 
agency costs and their impact on corporate perfor-
mance. The study has empirically examined the im-
pact of capital structure components on the equity 
agency costs of listed companies in Croatia, Slove-
nia and the Czech Republic. The empirical results 
indicate that changes in the capital structure affect 
equity agency costs differently in the examined list-
ed companies in the European Union. The results 
indicate that equity to capital and long-term debt to 
capital variables have a negative and significant im-
pact on the sales-to-asset ratio, as well as a positive 
and significant impact on the equity agency costs 
of listed companies in Croatia. The findings reveal 
that equity to capital, retained earnings to capital 
and long-term debt to capital variables are signifi-
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cant determinants of equity agency costs in Slove-
nia, while long-term debt to capital variable is a sig-
nificant determinant of equity agency costs in the 
Czech Republic. The results appear consistent with 
the results of Li and Cui (2003) and Nozari (2016) 
studies, which found that debt reduces agency costs. 
Indeed, the results obtained in this study lead to the 
conclusion that the capital structure decisions af-
fect the equity agency costs of listed companies. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a negative associa-
tion between agency costs and corporate value in 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic. We find evidence 
to suggest that changes in agency costs have little 
or no effect on performance of listed companies in 
Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.
Our study makes several important contributions to 
academics and managers. First, this paper contrib-
utes to the agency theory literature by conducting 
an empirical study on the relation between capital 
structure and the existence of equity agency costs, 
as well as the relation between equity agency costs 
and corporate performance. Second, our paper can 
help managers to better understand equity agency 
costs by showing them how their existence affects 
corporate performance. Our findings have poten-
tially important implications for managers. They in-
dicate that managers should aim to keep as close to 
the optimal debt-equity level as possible, and try to 
avoid any deviation in order to minimize the agency 
costs of equity as well as the agency costs of debt. 
In this work, we have not examined the impact of 
debt agency costs on corporate performance that 
remains an open question.
As a limitation of the present study, it should be 
noted that it is based on the secondary data taken 
from the published annual reports of the selected 
companies, and on ratio analysis, which has its own 
limitations. The results are limited to the countries 
analyzed and another constraint is a short time se-
ries of the data used. Future research should extend 
its analysis to a representative sample of listed com-
panies in the European Union and a long time series 
of data. Further analysis might focus on a range of 
agency costs measures and different aspects of cor-
porate performance.
Kontuš, E.: Agency costs, capital structure and corporate performance: A survey of Croatian, Slovenian and Czech listed companies
84 Vol. 34, No. 1 (2021), pp. 73-85
References
1. Ang, J. S., Cole, R. & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. The Journal of Finance, 
55(1), 81-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00201
2. Anh, N. T. & Thao, T. T. P. (2019). The impact of capital structure on firm performance of Vietnamese 
non-financial listed companies based on agency cost theory. VNU Journal of Science: Economics and 
Business, 35(2), 24-33. https://doi.org/10.25073/2588-1108/vnueab.4212
3. Belak, V. (2014). Analiza poslovne uspješnosti. Računovodstvo, revizija i financije.
4. Childs, P. D. & Mauer, D. C. (2008). Managerial Discretion, Agency Costs and Capital Structure. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108218
5. Colombo, M. G., Croce, A. & Martinu, S. (2014). Ownership structure, horizontal agency costs and the 
performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms. Small Business Economics, 42(2), 265-282. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-013-9483-y
6. Dawar, V. (2014). Agency theory, capital structure and firm performance: Some Indian Evidence. Man-
agerial Finance, 40(12), 1190-1206. https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-10-2013-0275
7. Grossman, S. & Hart, O. (1982). Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives. In McCall, 
J. (Ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty (pp. 107-140). University of Chicago Press. 
8. Harvey, R. C., Lins, K. V. & Roper, H. A. (2004). The Effect of capital structure when expected agency 
costs are extreme. Journal of Financial Economics, 74(1), 3-30. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.003
9. Hundal, S. (2015). Economic Value Added (EVA), Agency Costs and Firm Performance: Theoretical 
Insights through the Value Based Management (VBM) Framework. Finnish Business Review. http://
urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:jamk-issn-2341-9938-5/
10. Imelda, E. & Dewi, A. P. (2019). Capital structure, corporate governance and agency costs. In Manzano, 
J. A. et al. (Eds.). Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Entrepreneurship and Business Man-
agement (pp. 203-207). Jakarta: Universitas Tarumanagara. https://doi.org/10.5220/0008490602030207
11. Jabbary, H., Hasiha, Z. & Labesmka, R. H. (2013). Investigation of the effect of agency costs on firm 
performance of listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange. European Online Journal of Natural and Social 
Sciences, 2(3), 771-776.
12. Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
13. Jensen, M. C. (1986). The Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
14. Jiraporn, P. & Tong, S. (2007). Debt Maturity Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Value: Evidence from 
1973-2004 (Working Paper).
15. Khan, H. R., Khidmat, W. B., Al Hares, O., Muhammad, N. & Saleem, K. (2020). Corporate governance 
quality, ownership structure, agency costs and firm performance. Evidence from emerging economy. 
Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 13(7), 154-187. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm13070154
16. Li, H. & Cui, L. (2003). Empirical Study of Capital Structure on Agency Costs in Chinese Listed Firms. 
Nature and Science, 1(1), 12-20.
17. McKnight, P. J. & Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis. The Quarterly Review of Eco-
nomics and Finance, 49(2), 139-158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2007.09.008
18. Moschandreas, M. (2000). Business Economics. Thomson.
19. Moscu, R. G. (2014). Capital Structure and Corporate Performance of Romanian Listed Companies. 
International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 4(1), 
287-292. https://doi.org/10.6007/IJARAFMS/v4-i1/629
Kontuš, E.: Agency costs, capital structure and corporate performance: A survey of Croatian, Slovenian and Czech listed companies
85Vol. 34, No. 1 (2021), pp. 73-85
20. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinats of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147-
175. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(77)90015-0
21. Nam, J. & Wynne, K. (2006). The effect of agency costs on the value of single-segment and multi-segment 
firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 761-782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.06.003
22. Nozari, A. (2016). The Impact of Financial Leverage on Agency Costs of Free Cash Flows in Listed 
Manufacturing Firms of Tehran Stock Exchange. The Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art and Com-
munication, Special Edition, 2137-2144. https://doi.org/10.7456/1060AGSE/092
23. Opler, T. & Titman, S. (1993). The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free cash flow vs finan-
cial distress costs. Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1985-1999. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05138.x
24. Pandey, K. D. & Sahu, T. N. (2019). Debt Financing, Agency Cost and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
India. The Journal of Business Perspective, 23(3), 267-274. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972262919859203
25. Rashid, A. (2016). Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from Bangladesh. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 137(3), 609-621. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2570-z
26. Savitri, E. (2018). Relationship between family ownership, agency costs towards financial performance 
and business strategy as mediation. Business: Theory and Practice, 19(2), 49-58. 
https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2018.06
27. Seitz, N. & Ellison, M. (1995). Capital Budgeting and Long-Term Financial Decisions. Dryden Press.
28. Vijayamohanan, P. N. (2016). Panel Data Analysis with Stata: Fixed Effects and Random Effects (MPRA 
Paper No. 76869). Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive.
29. Xiao, S. (2009). How Do Agency Costs Affect Firm Value? Evidence from China. SSRN Electronic Jour-
nal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1865306
30. Wang, G. Y. (2010). The impact of free cash flows and agency costs on firm performance. Journal of 
Service Science and Management, 3(4), 408-418. https://doi.org/10.4236/jssm.2010.34047
31. Wellalage, N. H. & Locke, S. (2012). An empirical investigation of agency costs and ownership struc-
ture in unlisted small businesses. New Zealand Journal of Applied Business Research, 10(2), 37-48.
32. Williams, J. (1987). Perquisites, risk, and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 42(1), 29-48. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb02548.x
